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A RUSSELLIAN ANALYSIS OF
THE BUDDHIST CATUṢKOṬI
NICHOLAOS JONES

ABSTRACT: Names name, but there are no individuals who are named by names. This is
the key to an elegant and ideologically parsimonious strategy for analyzing the Buddhist
catuṣkoṭi. The strategy is ideologically parsimonious, because it appeals to no analytic
resources beyond those of standard predicate logic. The strategy is elegant, because it is, in
effect, an application of Bertrand Russell's theory of definite descriptions to Buddhist contexts.
The strategy imposes some minor adjustments upon Russell's theory. Attention to familiar
catuṣkoṭi from Vacchagotta and Nagarjuna as well as more obscure catuṣkoṭi from Khema,
Zhi Yi, and Fa Zang motivates the adjustments. The result is a principled structural distinction
between affirmative and negative catuṣkoṭi, as well as analyses for each that compare
favorably to more recent efforts from Tillemans, Westerhoff, and Priest (among others).
Keywords: antirealism, catuskoti, definite description, empty name, Fa Zang, Nagarjuna,
philosophy of language, reference failure, Russell, tetralemma
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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

A dilemma presents an interlocutor with a choice between one of two mutually
exclusive alternatives. A catuṣkoṭi (Chinese term 四句 si-ju, literally “four phrases”,
colloquially “tetralemma”), similarly, presents an interlocutor with a choice between
one of four mutually exclusive alternatives (Sanskrit term koṭi).1 Consider, for example,
an interlocutor asking, of a conversational partner, “Does the Buddha survive death?”
The question seems to admit exactly one of two answers. The partner might answer,
“Yes, the Buddha survives death.” The partner might answer, “No, the Buddha does
not survive death.” Straightforward analysis of these answers using standard
propositional logic entails that the interlocutor is presenting a dilemma. Let S stand for
________________________
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“The Buddha survives death”. Then the affirmative answer is S; the negative answer,
¬S. Since SÚ¬S and ¬(SÙ¬S) are theorems of standard propositional logic, it follows
that S and ¬S are mutually exclusive alternatives.
The straightforward analysis of “yes or no” questions yields several puzzles for the
exegesis of certain Buddhist discourses. Consider, for example, Vacchagotta’s
Discourse on Fire (Aggi-Vacchagotta Sutta MN 72), which presents a conversation
between the Buddha and a wandering ascetic named Vacchagotta. Vacchagotta raises
several issues: whether the cosmos is eternal (in duration); whether the cosmos is finite
(in size); whether the soul and the body are the same. Vacchagotta treats each issue as
a dilemma. But the Buddha’s responses are unusual. He denies every alternative. “Is
the cosmos eternal?” “No.” “Is the cosmos not eternal?” “No.” The discourse does not
report Vacchagotta’s affective reaction to the Buddha’s responses, but bafflement
would be appropriate. Straightforward analysis of the Buddha’s answers indicate that
he is contradicting himself. Perhaps by virtue of noticing this result while holding the
Buddha in great esteem, Vacchagotta alters his questioning strategy. On the issue of
whether a tathagata—someone who has attained Buddhahood—survives death,
Vacchagotta presents the Buddha with four alternatives rather than two: the tathagata
survives death; the tathagata does not survive death; the tathagata both survives and
does not survive death; the tathagata neither survives nor does not survive death. The
Buddha denies each alternative. (See Table 1.)
Question

Answer

S?
¬S?
SÙ¬S?
¬(SÚ¬S)?

¬S
¬¬S
¬(SÙ¬S)
¬¬(SÚ¬S)

Table 1: Straightforward Analysis of Vacchagotta’s Catuṣkoṭi
The shift in Vacchagotta’s questioning strategy yields an exegetical puzzle. How
does Vacchagotta’s third alternative (“both yes and no”) relate to the first two, and how
does his fourth alternative (“neither yes nor no”) relate to the third? If the alternatives
are part of a catuṣkoṭi rather than a dilemma, they should be mutually exclusive. An
affirmative answer to one should not entail an affirmative answer to another. Standard
propositional logic entails that affirming the third alternative is equivalent to affirming
each of the first two, and that affirming the fourth alternative is equivalent to affirming
the third. Moreover, if the third and fourth alternatives ask nothing beyond the content
of the first two, why does Vacchagotta change his questioning strategy?
The Buddha’s answers yield another exegetical puzzle. How might the Buddha’s
answers be jointly true? Vacchagotta’s Discourse on Fire depicts the Buddha as
someone Vacchagotta rightly seeks out for wisdom. Regardless of whether
Vacchagotta is presenting the Buddha with a dilemma or a catuṣkoṭi, the Buddha seems
to provide contradictory answers. By denying S, the Buddha seems to be affirming ¬S.
By denying ¬S, the Buddha seems to be affirming ¬¬S. If the Buddha is affirming
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both ¬S and ¬¬S, standard propositional logic entails that he is contradicting himself.
By denying SÙ¬S, the Buddha seems to contradict himself further, because this answer
is inconsistent with the conjunction of his first two answers. Moreover, by denying
¬(SÚ¬S), the Buddha seems to be piling contradiction upon contradiction, because the
answer is not only self-contradictory but also inconsistent with his other answers.
These puzzles about Vacchagotta’s catuṣkoṭi ramify. For example, in Chapter 25
of his Fundamentals of the Middle Way (Mulamadhyamakakarika, hereafter MMK),
Nagarjuna addresses the issue of whether the Buddha exists after death. He denies the
four alternatives of a catuṣkoṭi.
It is not to be asserted that the Buddha exists beyond cessation, nor “does not exist” nor
“both exists and does not exist,” nor “neither exists not does not exist”—none of these is
to be asserted (MMK 25.17; Siderits and Katsura 2013, 301).

This imitates Vacchagotta’s Discourse on Fire, except that Nagarjuna proceeds to deny
the four alternatives of a catuṣkoṭi about whether the Buddha exists prior to death
(MMK 25.18). Likewise, in his Great Cessation and Contemplation (Mo-He-Zhi-Guan
摩訶止観), Zhi Yi 智顗 (538-597), founder of the Chinese Tian-Tai 天台 tradition,
considers whether thoughts arise. While acknowledging that we say, in a deluded way,
that thoughts arise, he nonetheless denies that any thought arises from itself, from
another, from both itself and another, or from neither itself nor another (Swanson 2018,
199-200). Zhi Yi offers a similar catuṣkoṭi in his Profound Meaning of the Lotus Sutra
(Miao-Fa-Lian-Hua-Jing-Xuan-Yi 妙法蓮華經玄義), denying that dharmas arise from
themselves, from others, from both [themselves and others], or without cause (bu-zi,
bu-ta, bu-gong, bu-wu-yin 不自、不他、不共、不無因; T33.1716.699c20-c21).
2. APPROACHING THE CATUṢKOṬI
English-language efforts to resolve these exegetical puzzles typically search for logicbased solutions. The leading such efforts are analytic, ascribing hidden logical structure
to each alternative of the catuṣkoṭi. Consider, for example, the analyses of Robinson
(1957), Tillemans (1999, 199-200), and Westerhoff (2006). (See Table 2. I represent
each analysis with quantifiers that are absent in the originals for the sake of facilitating
structural comparisons. Priest adopts a similar approach (2010, 28).) Robinson
motivates his analysis by speculative analogy: there are four alternatives in the
catuṣkoṭi; there are four categorical forms in Aristotelian syllogistic logic; hence,
perhaps, each affirmative alternative in the catuṣkoṭi corresponds to some categorical
form or combination thereof. Tillemans, by contrast, is more principled: each
alternative entails an existentially quantified claim; and Buddhists deny each
alternative because they maintain that the domain of quantification is empty.
Westerhoff blends the analyses of Robinson and Tillemans in an effort to preserve
mutual exclusion among the four alternatives. He retains Robinson’s analysis for the
first two alternatives. He modifies Tillemans’ analysis for the third by relativizing the
predicate therein to distinct respects. Westerhoff also modifies the fourth alternative.
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He replaces the outermost sentential negations with illocutionary denials, so that ~S
means “S is denied” rather than “S is false”. He stipulates, as well, that an illocutionary
denial of an illocutionary denial is not an affirmation.
Question

Answer

Robinson’s
Analysis

Tillemans’
Analysis

Westerhoff’s
Analysis

S?
¬S?
SÙ¬S?
¬(SÚ¬S)?

¬S
¬¬S
¬(SÙ¬S)
¬¬(SÚ¬S)

¬∀xSx
¬∀x¬Sx
¬(ƎxSxÙƎx¬Sx)
¬(¬ƎxSxÙ¬Ǝx¬Sx)

¬ƎxSx
¬Ǝx¬Sx
¬Ǝx(SxÙ¬Sx)
¬Ǝx(¬SxÙ¬¬Sx)

¬∀xSx
¬∀x¬Sx
¬Ǝx(S'xÙ¬S''x)
~~Ǝx(SxÚ¬Sx)

Table 2: Analytic Interpretations of the Catuṣkoṭi
Are any of these analyses successful? Recent interpreters generally agree that a
successful analysis should satisfy three adequacy conditions. The first is that
ascriptions of quantificational structure should be well-motivated. There should be
good reason for ascribing free variables to alternatives that seem to be variable-free,
and there should be good reason for binding these variables with some specific
combination and ordering of quantifiers. The second adequacy condition is that
ascriptions of non-quantificational logical structure should be well-defined and wellmotivated. There should be good reason for introducing extra structure, and its meaning
should be well-understood. The third adequacy condition is that ascriptions of logical
structure should present the four alternatives as mutually exclusive and exhaustive.
Affirming one alternative should not require affirming another. Nor should any relevant
alternative be neglected.
The leading analytic efforts for understanding catuṣkoṭi seem to violate at least one
of these conditions. (Here I follow Priest 2010, 28-30.) On Robinson’s analysis, the
fourth alternative entails the second. Robinson also provides no good reason for the
specific quantificational structure he ascribes. Tillemans’ analysis likewise violates the
third adequacy condition. His third and fourth alternatives are equivalent; and the third
entails each of the first two. Westerhoff’s analysis seems to violate the second. The
predicate relativity in the third alternative seem to be ad hoc, and the illocutionary
denial he ascribes to the fourth alternative is ill-defined.
The inadequacies of analytic efforts to understand the catuṣkoṭi lend credence to
more revisionary efforts. These efforts interpret the four alternatives using atypical
constructions. Consider, for example, the analyses of Priest (2010) and Kreutz (2019).
(See Table 3.) Priest introduces angle brackets that act as name-forming operators, so
that T<S> means “S is true” and F<S> means “S is not true”. He then analyzes each
alternative of the catuṣkoṭi as positing one of four distinct truth-values for the same
claim: only true, only false, both true and false, neither true nor false. Kreutz combines
Priest’s innovations with Westerhoff’s appeal to illocutionary denial, interpreting all of
the negations in Priest’s analysis as denials of truth or denials of falsity (as appropriate).
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Question

Answer

Priest’s Analysis

Kreutz’s Analysis

S?
¬S?
SÙ¬S?
¬(SÚ¬S)?

¬S
¬¬S
¬(SÙ¬S)
¬¬(SÚ¬S)

¬(T<S>Ù¬F<S>)
¬(¬T<S>ÙF<S>)
¬(T<S>ÙF<S>)
¬(¬T<S>Ù¬F<S>)

~(T<S>Ù~F<S>)
~(~T<S>ÙF<S>)
~(T<S>ÙF<S>)
~(~T<S>Ù~F<S>)

Table 3: Revisionary Analyses of the Catuṣkoṭi
I have no decisive objection to the revisionary efforts by Priest and Kreutz. They
are laden with more ideology than analytic efforts. Ideology concerns concepts that
resist definition in terms of other concepts (see Cowling 2013, 3892-3893).
Revisionary efforts have additional ideology in the sense that, in addition to appealing
to concepts from standard predicate logic, they also appeal to concepts that resist
definition in terms of concepts from standard predicate logic. Priest’s analysis
introduces a name forming operator, E<S>, meaning “S is empty”. He defines the
operator informally, so that a claim is empty whenever it is neither true but not false,
false but not true, both true and false, and neither true nor false (Priest 2010, 37).
However, for the sake differentiating being empty from being neither true nor false, he
also stipulates that a claim is neither true nor false when neither it nor its negation is
true and it is not empty (Priest 2010, 38). The result is that E<S> is not definable using
only resources available from standard predicate logic.2 Kreutz’s analysis introduces a
logical operator for illocutionary negation to represent the speech act of denial (2019,
84-85). Because speech acts are not truth-functionally definable, Kreutz’s analysis also
requires ideology that is not available with standard predicate logic.
The inadequacies of extant analytic efforts indicate that some sort of ideological
escalation is, perhaps, necessary. I aim to demonstrate that this is not so. There is an
elegant analysis of the catuṣkoṭi available that satisfies all three conditions of adequacy.
The analysis takes seriously Tillemans’ contention that, in denying each alternative of
a catuṣkoṭi, Buddhists mean to affirm that no individual satisfies the relevant predicate.
The analysis I offer improves upon Tillemans’ by making explicit why the denials are
apt and how the catuṣkoṭi arises for those who misunderstand what their Buddhist
interlocutors mean to affirm. It invokes no resources beyond those available in standard
predicate logic and thereby qualifies as less ideological than revisionary efforts.3 For
reasons that should become apparent, I shall refer to the analysis as Russellian.
2

Whether Priest’s analysis requires further ideology is difficult to determine. Cotnoir argues that Priest’s
analysis requires two primitive truth predicates, one for conventional truth and one for ultimate truth, in
order to accommodate various patterns of conditional reasoning (Cotnoir 2015). Kreutz offers two
responses on behalf of Priest. He argues, first, that adding a set of inferences that are usually, but not
always, valid suffices (Kreutz 2019, 83). He argues, second, that proper attention to Priest’s emptiness
operator removes the motivation for Cotnoir’s objection (Kreutz 2019, 83-84). If Cotnoir’s objection or
Kreutz’s first response thereto is correct, Priest’s analysis requires a second extra piece of ideology
beyond standard predicate logic, in the form of an extra truth predicate or an extra sort of validity.
3
Tillemans motivates his analysis by restricting the scope of the catuṣkoṭi to the domain of ultimate
truths in contrast to truths of convention. The distinction between kinds of truth remains poorly defined
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3. MOTIVATING A RUSSELLIAN ANALYSIS
Catuṣkoṭi from the Buddhist tradition present two exegetical challenges. The first is to
understand how the four alternatives relate to each other such that affirming one does
not require affirming another. The second is to understand how one might
simultaneously deny all four alternatives as incorrect. Analyses that purport to resolve
these challenges are subject to three adequacy conditions: any reinterpretation of the
alternatives that invokes hidden quantificational structure should be well-motivated;
any reinterpretation that invokes other logical ideology should be well-motivated, and
the ideology should be well-defined; and any reinterpretation of the alternatives should
present them as mutually exclusive. The analysis I offer aims to satisfy all three
conditions. The analysis is, in effect, a synthesis of Buddhist antirealism with an
interpretation of names as predicates. It begins from the observation that when each
alternative of a catuṣkoṭi is false, the source of falsity is a failure of reference.
When a claim exhibits reference failure, it contains a name that designates an
individual and yet the named individual does not exist. Paradigmatic examples of
reference failure include “Phlogiston is an ignitable matter present in flammable
substances”, “Vulcan is a planet between Mercury and the sun”, and “Persephone
preserves seeds from dangerous weather”. I maintain that Buddhists deny claims such
as “The Buddha survives death”, not because they affirm that the Buddha fails to
survive death, but because they affirm that the Buddha’s name fails to designate an
existing individual. If Sb translates “The Buddha survives death”, Buddhists deny Sb
and so affirm ¬Sb, because they affirm there is no one who is named the Buddha. They
also deny ¬Sb, and so affirm ¬¬Sb, for the same reason. Or so I maintain, subject to
suitable analysis of the affirmations and denials. Call this assumption Reference
Failure.
3.1

BUDDHIST ANTIREALISM

There is good reason, internal to the Buddhist tradition, for endorsing Reference
Failure. Consider, first, Khema’s Discourse (Khema Sutta SN44.1), which reports a
brief dialogue between the eminent nun Khema and a king named Pasenadi (6th c.
BCE). The king presents Khema with a catuṣkoṭi about whether the tathagata survives
death. It is identical to the catuṣkoṭi that Vacchagotta presents to the Buddha. Khema
declares that the Buddha denies each alternative. But unlike Vacchagotta, who changes
the subject, the king asks Khema to explain the Buddha’s reason. Khema obliges with
a metaphor. She asks the king whether he employs someone to count the drops of water
in the great ocean (mahasamudda). The king answers that he does not. Khema asks him
to explain. He answers that the ocean is “deep, boundless, hard to fathom” (gambhira,
(see McDaniel 2019, Brenner 2020). For the sake of respecting the second constraint on a successful
analysis of the catuṣkoṭi, according to which ascriptions of non-quantificational logical structure should
be well-defined and well-motivated, I do not invoke the distinction between kinds of truth.
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appameyya, duppariyogaha). (The intended implication is that efforts to count the
ocean’s drops of water are doomed to fail, because the number of drops is innumerable,
immeasurable, inexhaustible.) Khema then completes the metaphor: the tathagata, too,
is deep, boundless, hard to fathom. The tathagata’s profundity ensures that all efforts
to describe the tathagata fail. The efforts fail, according to Khema, not because
language cannot match the tathagata’s infinite grandeur, but because the tathagata is
“released from conceptions that pertain to materiality” (rupa-sankhaya-vimutta).
Reference Failure offers a natural interpretation for Khema’s explanation. Because
there is no one who is named the tathagata, there is no one named the tathagata who
encounters death. Since there is no one named the tathagata, the tathagata is released
from being counted as either surviving or failing to survive death. Just as efforts to
count the number of drops in the ocean—as one million, one billion, one trillion, and
so on—are doomed to fail, so too are efforts to count the tathagata as surviving death,
failing to survive death, both surviving and failing to survive, or neither surviving nor
failing to survive.
Consider, next, The Questions of King Milinda (Milinda Panha), an extended
dialogue in which a king named Milinda learns about Buddhism from a visiting monk
named Nagasena. Milinda respectfully asks Nagasena to identify himself by declaring
his name and how he is known. Nagasena answers that his name is Nagasena and that,
although his name is a designation (pannatti) for a person, his name does not refer to a
person (puggalo). The subsequent dialectical exchange is rich, and it rewards careful
study. Disregarding subtle details, Nagasena’s answer indicates that he affirms three
metaphysical principles. The first is that each person is one rather than many. The
second is that each person is composite rather than atomic. The third is that no
composite is one.4 These principles jointly entail that there are no persons.
The absence of persons entails, as a corollary, that insofar as Nagasena’s name
designates a person, it fails to refer. Let the miniscule n be a name for the person
Nagasena. This name either succeeds or fails in referring to a person. Suppose, for
reductio ad absurdum, that Nagasena’s name, n, refers to a person. Then there is a
person who is Nagasena. The first principle entails that this person is one; the second
and third, that the person is not one. Hence, there is nothing that is a person and named
Nagasena. Yet the same supposition, that Nagasena’s name refers to a person, also
4

There is good reason, within the Buddhist tradition, for affirming each of these principles. Here I only
gesture toward relevant justifications. Regarding the first, those lacking nirvana conceptualize
themselves as one, and they take this conceptualization to be a truth of reality. So persons, real persons,
are one rather than many. Regarding the second, atomic persons—persons lacking proper parts—would
be immune to dukkha by virtue of existing independently of others. Because persons are not immune to
dukkha, persons are not atomic; and because anything not atomic is composite, persons are composite.
Regarding the third, a composite is one only if it is identical to either one of its proper parts, more than
one (in relation or not, exhaustively or not), or something other than its proper parts. Because every
composite has at least two disjoint proper parts, no composite is identical to one of its proper parts.
Because no individual is both one and many, no composite is identical to more than one of its proper
parts. Were a composite identical to something separate from its proper parts, it would be possible to
encounter the composite without encountering any of its proper parts. Because such encounters are
impossible, it follows that no composite is one.
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entails Nagasena is a person. Since everything is self-identical, it follows that there is
something named Nagasena. This completes the reductio. So Nagasena’s name does
not refer to a person. Because the name, n, is a name for a person, it follows that
Nagasena’s name fails to refer.
Subsequent Buddhist tradition extends Nagasena’s conclusion from composites to
(atomic) dharmas. For example, in his MMK, Nagarjuna endorses two relevant
principles. The first is that every dharma has an intrinsic nature (svabhava); the second,
that nothing has intrinsic nature. These principles entail that any name that designates
a dharma fails to refer. This argument, together with Nagasena’s argument for
Reference Failure regarding composite individuals, entails Universal Reference
Failure: all names fail to refer. In The Dispeller of Disputes (Vigrahavyāvartanī),
Nagarjuna explicitly endorses Universal Reference Failure.
[W]e do not assert a referring name. This is because a name, too, due to the absence of
substance [svabhava] in things, is insubstantial and therefore empty. Because of its
emptiness it is non-referring (Westerhoff 2010, 37; see also Westerhoff 2019, 782-785).

The 25,000 Line Discourse on the Perfection of Wisdom (Pancavimsatisahasrikaprajnaparamita-sutra) also endorses Universal Reference Failure, comparing names
to the traces left in the sky by flying birds, and warning against tendencies to cling to
names themselves (namasanketa-prajnapti), names for composites (avavadaprajnapti), and names for partless atoms (dharma-prajnapti) (see Wang 2001, 118).
3.2

CHALLENGES FOR REFERENCE FAILURE

Regardless of its interpretive aptness, Reference Failure seems to be an ill-advised
assumption. Standard predicate logic satisfies Bivalence, the principle according to
which, for every claim, either it or its negation is true. If Pn translates “Nagasena is a
person”, Bivalence entails that either Pn is true or ¬Pn is true. The first disjunct entails
Ǝx(PxÙx=n); the second, Ǝx(¬PxÙx=n). Constructive dilemma yields, as a corollary,
that Nagasena's name, abbreviated as the miniscule n, designates an existing individual.
Reference Failure entails, to the contrary, that Nagasena's name designates no one. It
follows that Nagasena's name refers and fails to refer. But standard predicate logic also
validates, as a theorem, Non-Contradiction. This is the principle according to which,
for any predicate Φx, ¬Ǝx(ΦxÙ¬Φx). So there seems to be a choice: endorse Reference
Failure and jettison some part of standard predicate logic; or retain standard predicate
logic and reject Reference Failure.5
Reference Failure also seems to be an ill-formed assumption. The most natural
articulation for the assumption is this: some names fail to refer to existing individuals.
But this is unsatisfying. Consider a name that does not refer to any existing individual.
5

For reasons to suppose that Buddhists typically endorse Non-Contradiction, see Robinson 1957, 295296. For reasons to suppose that Buddhists typically endorse Bivalence, see Ruegg 1997, 47-52. (Ruegg
discusses Bivalence under the label excluded middle.) Nagarjuna endorses instances of both principles.
For Non-Contradiction, see MMK 7.30 and 8.7; for Bivalence, see MMK 5.6.
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Because all names designate individuals, this name designates some individual.
Because the name fails to refer, the designated individual is not an existing individual.
There are no non-existing individuals.6 But every individual either exists or not. So
there is not, after all, a name that fails to refer. Every name, it seems, refers to some
existing individual. Similar considerations tell against articulating Reference Failure
as the principle that some names do not refer at all. Whatever its proper articulation,
Reference Failure seems to entail that when a name fails to refer, it designates an
individual that is (numerically) distinct from everything. Because everything is, of
necessity, (numerically) identical to itself, it seems to follow that Reference Failure
never obtains.
3.3

NAMES AS PREDICATES

These challenges for articulating and making coherent Reference Failure vanish if
names function as predicates rather than individual constants. If names function as
constants, translating “Nagasena is a person” into the language of standard predicate
logic proceeds as follows: designate an individual constant, n, as naming Nagasena;
assign a predicate, Px, to stand for “x is a person”; then translate “Nagasena is a person”
as Pn. If, by contrast, names function as predicates, translating “Nagasena is a person”
into the language of standard predicate logic proceeds as follows: assign a predicate,
Nx, to stand for “x is the one named Nagasena”; assign Px to stand for “x is a person”;
then translate “Nagasena is a person” as Ǝx(NxÙPx).
Reference Failure contravenes the necessity of self-identity if names function as
constants, but not if names function as predicates. Consider, for example, the claim
“Nagasena does not exist”. If names function as constants, this translates as ¬Ǝx(x=n)
and so violates the necessary truth n=n. If names function as predicates, the same claim
translates as ¬ƎxNx. This translation is perfectly consistent with the necessity of selfidentity. It also reveals that the miniscule n is not a name for Nagasena. This result,
which generalizes for all names, is exactly correct. Insofar as all names refer to existing
individuals and Nagasena does not exist, no name refers to Nagasena.7
Similarly, Reference Failure conflicts with Non-Contradiction and Bivalence if
names function as constants, but not if names function as predicates. Consider, again,
6

Suppose, for reductio ad absurdum, that there is a non-existing individual—the planet Vulcan, perhaps,
residing between Mercury and the sun. Because Vulcan does not exist, there is no individual that is
(numerically) identical to Vulcan. But everything is self-identical. So there is an individual that is
identical to Vulcan, namely, Vulcan. This completes the reductio.
7
An insistence upon treating names as predicates (or descriptions), and never as individual constants, is
the main innovation for the analysis to follow. It complicates the procedure for translating from natural
language into the language of standard predicate logic, but the complication is necessary for preserving
standard predicate logic. Beginning with Leonard 1956, some take the complication to warrant
abandoning standard logic for a system of free logic. I ignore this option, for the sake of minimizing
ideological innovation. For efforts toward an interpretation of Dharmakirti’s apoha semantics using a
dual-domain free logic, see Schweizer 2015. Yao (2009) and McGeever (2018), by contrast, offer further
motivation for treating names as predicates in Buddhist contexts.
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the claim “Nagasena is a person”. If names function as constants, Bivalence entails that
either Pn is true or ¬Pn is true. Constructive dilemma yields, as a corollary, Ǝx(x=n).
Reference Failure entails, to the contrary, ¬Ǝx(x=n). Non-Contradiction thereby forces
a choice: deny Ǝx(x=n) and reject Bivalence, or else deny ¬Ǝx(x=n) and reject
Reference Failure. If names function as predicates, there is no such forced choice.
Bivalence entails that either Ǝx(NxÙPx) is true or ¬Ǝx(NxÙPx) is true. Reference
Failure entails ¬ƎxNx. No contradiction follows.
3.4

THE RUSSELLIAN CONNECTION

The challenges that beset Reference Failure, and that admit to resolution if names
function as predicates, resemble the challenges that motivated Bertrand Russell to
develop his theory of definite descriptions. Russell (1905) examines the claim, “The
present king of France is bald”. This is a description, because it describes someone or
something as being a certain way (or satisfying a predicate). The description is definite,
because the name for the someone or something so described contains the definite
article. The background assumption is that there is no present king of France, because
France at present is a democracy rather than a monarchy (and democracies lack kings).
The challenge, as Russell understands it, is to analyze the claim’s logical form in a way
that exhibits why it is false while preserving both Bivalence and Non-Contradiction.
His solution involves analyzing the claim as an implicit threefold conjunction. One
conjunct serves as an existence condition, declaring that at least one individual satisfies
the predicate for being the present king of France. A second conjunct serves as a
uniqueness condition, declaring that at most one individual satisfies the predicate for
being the present king of France. A third, finally, serves as a maximality condition,
declaring that any individual satisfying the “is the present king of France” predicate
also satisfies the predicate for being bald. If Kx stands for “x is the present king of
France” and “Bx” stands for “x is bald”, Russell’s analysis translates “The present king
of France is bald” as:
ƎxKx Ù ∀x∀y(KxÙKy ® x=y) Ù Ǝx(Kx ® Bx).
Because there is no present king of France, the first conjunct of this translation is false.
So the analysis explains why “The present king of France is bald” is false. It does so,
moreover, without violating Bivalence or Non-Contradiction. Russell’s theory of
definite descriptions maintains that definite descriptions are properly analyzed as
threefold conjunctions having the same logical form as this paradigm case.
Russell’s theory has limitations. It fares poorly as an analysis for definite mass
descriptions and definite plural descriptions. (Here I follow Sharvy 1980, but see also
Gendler Szabó 2005.) For example, “The Buddha drank the tea in this room” is a
definite description that contains a mass predicate (‘is tea in this room’). According to
Russell’s theory, exactly one individual satisfies this predicate. But, pre-theoretically,
if the Buddha is drinking in a room with other monks, the predicate applies to the tea
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in their cups too. Similarly, “The Buddha addressed the monks in this room” is a
definite description that contains a plural predicate (‘are monks in this room’).
According to Russell’s theory, exactly one person satisfies this predicate. But pretheoretically, it applies to each of them. Russell’s theory also fails to apply to proper
names (in English), which contain no article.
Objections pertaining to the scope of Russell’s theory admit to solution through
creative reinterpretation of naming conventions. For example, Graff Fara interprets
proper names as denuded definite descriptions—definite descriptions with an
unpronounced definite article (Graff Fara 2015, 70). So interpreted, the name
‘Nagasena’ is semantically equivalent to ‘(the) Nagasena’ or ‘the one who is named
Nagasena’. Objections pertaining to the strength of Russell’s theory admit to solution
by modifying one or more of his preferred conjuncts. For example, Sharvy (1980)
demonstrates that a slight adjustment to the uniqueness condition suffices for extending
the theory to mass predicates and plural predicates. For Russell’s paradigm case,
Sharvy prefers the following analysis (with y£x standing for the relation “y is a proper
part of x or y=x”):
ƎxKx Ù ∀x∀y(KxÙKy ® x£y) Ù Ǝx(Kx ® Bx).
Although Sharvy’s analysis is not Russell’s, it is Russellian for three reasons. First, it
treats names as predicates. Second, it posits that an individual satisfies such a predicate
only if the individual named by the predicate exists. Third, it analyzes definite
descriptions as bearers of scope, so that negations thereof are ambiguous between
negating the description as a whole and negating some specific part, and so that
negating the description as a whole does not entail negating one specific part rather
than another.
Evans provides notation that helps to represent the core components of a Russellian
analysis. He introduces a binary quantifier Ix (read: “the x”) to represent “The Φ is Ψ”
as Ix[Φx; Ψx] (read: “the x that is the one named Φ is Ψ”) (Evans 1982, 58). This binary
quantifier admits the following partial definition:
If Ix[Φx; Ψx], then Ǝx(ΦxÙΨx).
The binary quantifier is not part of standard predicate logic. But nothing it adds to
standard predicate logic—if, indeed, it adds anything at all—is necessary for the
Russellian analyses to follow. The partial definition suffices to reveal how “The Φ is
not Ψ” is ambiguous between
¬Ix[Φx; Ψx], which entails only ¬Ǝx(ΦxÙΨx); and
Ix[Φx; ¬Ψx], which entails Ǝx(ΦxÙ¬Ψx).
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It suffices to reveal, as well, that ¬Ix[Φx; Ψx] does not entail Ix[Φx; ¬Ψx]. This has
the virtue of allowing Ix[Φx; Ψx] to be false regardless of whether ƎxΨx is true. The
partial definition for the binary quantifier Ix also has virtues beyond its suitability for
representing the core components of a Russellian analysis. It provides a complete
definition for indefinite descriptions. This guarantees that Russellian analyses are
possible for languages—such as Sanskrit, Latin, and Chinese—that lack articles.8 The
definition also allows applications of Russellian analysis to disregard concerns about
Russell’s uniqueness condition. I turn now to just such an application.
4. A RUSSELLIAN ANALYSIS OF THE CATUṢKOṬI
Buddhist antirealism seems to entail that some names, although they name, are such
that no individuals are the ones who are named. Treating names as predicates rather
than individual constants helps to make sense of this entailment, and a Russellian
analysis of name-containing descriptions indicates that, when names are treated as
predicates, such descriptions contain hidden quantificational structure. This suggests
that a Russellian analysis of the alternatives of Buddhist catuṣkoṭi might resolve the
exegetical challenges associated with those catuṣkoṭi. I shall proceed, accordingly, to
demonstrate that Russellian analysis does just this, and that it does so in ways that
satisfy the three adequacy conditions for successful analyses. I demonstrate, as well,
that the resulting analysis compares favorably to other analytic interpretations of the
catuṣkoṭi.
4.1

PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS

Consider, once more, Vacchagotta’s Discourse on Fire and the issue of whether the
tathagata survives death. Let Tx stand for “x is the one named tathagata”. Let Sx stand
for “x survives death”. Russellian analysis of “The tathagata survives death” is
straightforward: Ix[Tx; Sx]. Analysis of “The tathagata does not survive death” yields
two alternatives: ¬Ix[Tx; Sx] or Ix[Tx; ¬Sx]. Reference Failure selects the second of
these as appropriate. According to Reference Failure, the Buddha denies that the
tathagata does not survive death because he denies that there is an individual named
the tathagata. Since ¬Ix[Tx; Sx] is true if there is no individual named the tathagata,
the Buddha, in denying that the tathagata does not survive death, must be denying
8

Consider, for example, Gongsun Long (公孫龍)’s so-called White Horse Paradox: bai-ma-fei-ma 白
馬非馬. Translating with minimal interpretation, this is the claim “white horse not horse”. There is a
Russellian analysis that interprets the claim as follows: let Wx stand for “x is white”, Hx stand for “x is
a horse”, and Ox stand for “x is the one who is named as a white horse”; then analyze “white horse not
horse” as ¬Ix[Ox; Hx]. This entails ¬Ǝx(OxÙHx ). Given the reasonable background assumption that
∀x(Ox ↔ (WxÙHx))—every white horse is white and a horse, and whatever is white and a horse is a
white horse—it follows that¬Ǝx(Ox). This Russellian analysis of the White Horse Paradox suggests,
therefore, that Gongsun Long means to declare that ‘white horse’ (bai-ma 白馬), the name, fails to refer.
But, regardless of whether the analysis is apt, it demonstrates the applicability of Russellian analysis to
an article-free language.
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Ix[Tx; ¬Sx]. Similar reasoning selects similarly scoped claims for Vacchagotta’s third
and fourth alternatives. A Russellian analysis of Vacchagotta’s catuṣkoṭi, together with
Reference Failure, thereby yields a preliminary interpretation of the four alternatives.9
(See Table 4.)
The tathagata survives death.
The tathagata does not survive death.
The tathagata both survives death and does not survive death.
The tathagata neither survives death nor does not survive death.

Ix[Tx; Sx]
Ix[Tx; ¬Sx]
Ix[Tx; (SxÙ¬Sx)]
Ix[Tx; ¬(SxÚ¬Sx)]

Table 4: Preliminary Analysis of Vacchagotta’s Catuṣkoṭi
This preliminary interpretation satisfies two of three adequacy conditions for a
successful analysis of Vacchagotta’s catuṣkoṭi. Ascriptions of quantificational structure
are well-motivated. Free variables are necessary to accommodate the analysis of names
as predicates, and the quantifiers binding these variables are appropriate for Russellian
reasons. Ascriptions of non-quantificational logical structure are also well-motivated.
The only such structure is the placement of the negation operator for the final three
alternatives, and Reference Failure justifies placing the operator within the scope of
Evans’ binary quantifier.
Despite these virtues, the preliminary interpretation does not yield four alternatives
that are mutually exclusive. Ix[Tx; (SxÙ¬Sx)] entails both Ix[Tx; Sx] and Ix[Tx; ¬Sx],
and Ix[Tx; (SxÙ¬Sx)] is equivalent to Ix[Tx; ¬(SxÚ¬Sx)]. Attending to the dialectical
structure of Vacchagotta’s catuṣkoṭi motivates a modified interpretation that avoids this
problem. Each question-answer pair in Vacchagotta’s conversation with the Buddha
involves a spoken component and an unspoken component. The spoken component is
the public question-answer pair. The unspoken component, by contrast, is private and
includes the Buddha’s reason for his answer and the inference Vacchagotta makes from
the Buddha’s spoken answer. The Buddha’s reason, I maintain, is always the failure of
the tathagata’s name to refer. I maintain, further, that the next question Vacchagotta
asks indicates Vacchagotta’s unspoken inference. Doing so helps to explain why
Vacchagotta continues the conversation in the specific way he does. Doing so also
portrays Vacchagotta as one who incorrectly and unwittingly presupposes that the
tathagata’s name designates an existing individual.

9

Strawson (1950) famously objects to Russell’s view that reference failure renders definite descriptions
false. Strawson argues that it is more intuitive to treat such claims as neither true nor false. Shaw offers
a compromise: Strawson’s view is appropriate when the interlocutors know there is a failure of reference,
and Russell’s view is appropriate otherwise (Shaw 1988, 164-167). Insofar as Vacchagotta incorrectly
presumes referential success, Shaw’s compromise removes Strawsonian-style objections to applying
Russell’s view to Vacchagotta’s catuṣkoṭi. Regardless of whether Shaw’s compromise is appropriate, I
maintain that Strawson’s objections to the truth of Russell’s view are not objections to applying Russell’s
view to catuṣkoṭi. There is no good reason to suppose that the intuitions to which Strawson appeals are
intuitions Buddhists would endorse.
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4.2

DIALECTICAL STRUCTURE

The dialectical structure of Vacchagotta’s first exchange with the Buddha is relatively
clear. The Buddha denies that the tathagata survives death, and Vacchagotta interprets
this answer as meaning that some existing individual, the tathagata, does not survive
death. The structure of the second exchange is more obscure. The Buddha denies that
the tathagata does not survive death. There are two ways for Vacchagotta to interpret
this answer while presupposing, incorrectly, that the tathagata’s name refers. He can
interpret the Buddha as meaning to affirm that some existing individual, the tathagata,
survives death. Or he can interpret the Buddha as meaning to affirm, instead, that NonContradiction does not hold of the tathagata. If Non-Contradiction holds for the
(existing) tathagata, the Buddha speaks falsely when answering Vacchagotta’s
questions. Insofar as Vacchagotta’s esteem for the Buddha inclines him to interpret the
Buddha as speaking truthfully, Vacchagotta likely infers, from the Buddha’s answer,
that the Buddha means to affirm that Non-Contradiction does not hold of the tathagata.
In the third exchange, the Buddha denies that the tathagata both survives and does
not survive death. Vacchagotta’s inferences from the first two exchanges should incline
him to infer, in the third exchange, that Non-Contradiction is not the Buddha’s concern.
Insofar as Vacchagotta presupposes, incorrectly, that the tathagata’s name refers, and
insofar as he inclines toward interpreting the Buddha as speaking truthfully, this leaves
Vacchagotta with one option: infer that, in answering the third question, the Buddha
means to affirm that Vacchagotta’s first two alternatives are neither true nor false. If
this is the Buddha’s meaning, the Buddha is rejecting Bivalence. So when Vacchagotta
asks the Buddha, in the fourth exchange, whether he affirms that the tathagata neither
survives nor does not survive death, he likely means to ask whether the Buddha rejects
Bivalence. Since Vacchagotta changes the topic of conversation, the inference
Vacchagotta draws from the Buddha’s final answer is unknown.
Because Vacchagotta’s conversation with the Buddha contains unspoken
dialectical structure, it is helpful to make the structure explicit. In doing so, I maintain
that Vacchagotta considers Non-Contradiction and Bivalence as candidates for
rejection in the conversation.10 I assume that, in the third alternative, Vacchagotta is
foregrounding Non-Contradiction as a target for rejection and disregarding the status
of Bivalence. I assume, as well, that in the fourth alternative he is foregrounding
Bivalence as a target for rejection and disregarding the status of Non-Contradiction. I
also maintain that the Buddha, in declining to affirm an alternative, directs his denial
to the spoken content of the alternative. Then, if NC abbreviates Non-Contradiction
and BV abbreviates Bivalence, Vacchagotta’s exchanges with the Buddha have the
structure indicated by Table 5.

10

Neither of Bivalence nor Non-Contradiction entails the other. Intuitionistic logic satisfies NonContradiction but not Bivalence. Belnap’s four-valued logic satisfies Bivalence but not NonContradiction (see Belnap 1977).
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Vacchagotta’s First Alternative
Vacchagotta’s
Question
Buddha’s
Answer
Buddha’s
Reason
Vacchagotta’s
Inference

Do you affirm that the
tathagata survives death?

Ix[Tx; Sx] Ù NC Ù BV?

I do not.

¬Ix[Tx; Sx] Ù NC Ù BV

There is no individual
named the tathagata.
He affirms that the
tathagata does not survive
death.

¬ƎxTx
Ix[Tx; ¬Sx] Ù NC Ù BV

Vacchagotta’s Second Alternative
Vacchagotta’s
Question
Buddha’s
Answer
Buddha’s
Reason
Vacchagotta’s
Inference

Do you affirm that the
tathagata does not survive
death?

Ix[Tx; ¬Sx] Ù NC Ù BV?

I do not.

¬Ix[Tx; ¬Sx] Ù NC Ù BV

There is no individual
named the tathagata.
He affirms that the
tathagata survives and
does not survive death.

¬ƎxTx
Ix[Tx; (SxÙ¬Sx)] Ù ¬NC Ù (BVÚ¬BV)

Vacchagotta’s Third Alternative
Vacchagotta’s
Question
Buddha’s
Answer
Buddha’s
Reason
Vacchagotta’s
Inference

Do you affirm that the
tathagata survives and
does not survive death?

Ix[Tx; (SxÙ¬Sx)] Ù ¬NC Ù (BVÚ¬BV)?

I do not.

¬Ix[Tx; (SxÙ¬Sx)] Ù ¬NC Ù (BVÚ¬BV)

There is no individual
named the tathagata.
He affirms that the
tathagata neither survives
nor does not survive death.

¬ƎxTx
Ix[Tx; ¬(SxÚ¬Sx)] Ù (NCÚ¬NC) Ù ¬BV

Vacchagotta’s Fourth Alternative
Vacchagotta’s
Question
Buddha’s
Answer
Buddha’s
Reason
Vacchagotta’s
Inference

Do you affirm that the
tathagata neither survives
nor does not survive
death?

Ix[Tx; ¬(SxÚ¬Sx)] Ù (NCÚ¬NC) Ù ¬BV?

I do not.

¬Ix[Tx; ¬(SxÚ¬Sx)] Ù (NCÚ¬NC) Ù ¬BV

There is no individual
named the tathagata.
Unknown.

¬ƎxTx
Unknown.

Table 5: The Dialectical Structure of Vacchagotta’s Catuṣkoṭi
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4.3

MODIFIED ANALYSIS

Attending to the dialectical structure of Vacchagotta’s conversation with the Buddha
indicates that each of Vacchagotta’s alternatives contains an unspoken contention about
Non-Contradiction and Bivalence. Revising the preliminary Russellian analysis to
make these declarations explicit yields a modified analysis that satisfies the three
adequacy conditions for a successful analysis of Vacchagotta’s catuṣkoṭi. (See Table
6.)
The tathagata survives death.
The tathagata does not survive death.
The tathagata both survives death and does
not survive death.
The tathagata neither survives death nor
does not survive death.

Ix[Tx; Sx] Ù NC Ù BV
Ix[Tx; ¬Sx] Ù NC Ù BV
Ix[Tx; (SxÙ¬Sx)] Ù ¬NC Ù (BVÚ¬BV)
Ix[Tx; ¬(SxÚ¬Sx)] Ù (NCÚ¬NC) Ù¬BV

Table 6: Modified Analysis of Vacchagotta’s Catuṣkoṭi
Vacchagotta’s esteem for the Buddha and his mistaken presupposition motivate
ascribing implicit declarations about logical principles. Moreover, the four alternatives
in the modified analysis are mutually exclusive with respect to the following topic:
Does the tathagata survive death or not? Consider, as evidence, the table in Table 7.
Ix[Tx; Sx]?
yes
no
yes
no

Ix[Tx; ¬Sx]?
no
yes
yes
no

Alternative
Option 1, with NC and BV
Option 2, with NC and BV
Option 3, with ¬NC and (BVÚ¬BV)
Option 4, with ¬BV and (NCÚ¬NC)

Table 7: Mutual Exclusion in Vacchagotta’s Catuṣkoṭi
The table neglects some alternatives, such as affirming that the tathagata survives death
while rejecting Non-Contradiction and Bivalence. These neglected alternatives are
rhetorically extravagant. Their extravagance is good reason to suppose that
Vacchagotta and the Buddha consider them to be irrelevant to their conversation. The
table also neglects the alternative of referential failure. There is good rhetorical reason
for this neglect: the conversation portrays Vacchagotta as an interlocutor who
unwittingly endorses referential success. Hence, although the alternatives are not
logically exhaustive, they are rhetorically exhaustive. They are exhaustive in all the
ways that matter for Vacchagotta’s exchange with the Buddha.
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4.4

THE LESSON OF THE CATUṢKOṬI

The modified Russellian analysis of Vacchagotta’s catuṣkoṭi presumes that
Vacchagotta, in proceeding through his alternatives, treats Non-Contradiction and
Bivalence as principles the Buddha might reject. However, it does not presume that the
Buddha treats these as candidates for rejection. The analysis also presumes that names
function as predicates and that, in denying each alternative, the Buddha denies that any
existing individual satisfies such predicates. It does not, however, presume that the
Buddha treats names as predicates. The result is an interpretation of the Buddha’s
answers that compares favorably to its predecessors. (See Table 8.)
Robinson’s Analysis
¬∀xSx
¬∀x¬Sx
¬(ƎxSxÙƎx¬Sx)
¬(¬ƎxSxÙ¬Ǝx¬Sx)

Tillemans’
Analysis
¬ƎxSx
¬Ǝx¬Sx
¬Ǝx(SxÙ¬Sx)
¬Ǝx(¬SxÙ¬¬Sx)

Westerhoff’s
Analysis
¬∀xSx
¬∀x¬Sx
¬Ǝx(S'xÙ¬S''x)
~~Ǝx(SxÚ¬Sx)

Russellian Analysis
¬Ix[Tx; Sx]
¬Ix[Tx; ¬Sx]
¬Ix[Tx; (SxÙ¬Sx)]
¬Ix[Tx; ¬(SxÚ¬Sx)]

Table 8: Comparing the Russellian Analysis to Predecessors
The Russellian analysis most closely resembles Tillemans’, with the exception of
treating each answer as correct by virtue of reference failure rather than by virtue of
some individual failing to satisfy the ascribed predicate. It resembles Westerhoff’s as
well, because it permits all four negations to be jointly and simultaneously true.
Westerhoff achieves this result by introducing illocutionary denials and relativized
predicates. The Russellian analysis achieves it, by contrast, by treating names as
predicates. If the modified Russellian analysis is correct, the lesson of Vacchagotta’s
catuṣkoṭi is not that one or more standard logical principles fail. Nor, in contrast to
Priest 2010, is the lesson that claims about reality have some atypical truth status. If
the modified Russellian analysis is correct, the lesson of Vacchagotta’s catuṣkoṭi is that,
because there is no one named the tathagata, there are no truths about the tathagata.
This lesson coheres with the Buddha’s subsequent conversation with Vacchagotta.
The Buddha offers a fire analogy. When there is a fire burning, it is correct to say that
the fire is burning, that the fire depends upon its fuel, that the fire travels this way rather
than that. But when the fire ceases, it is incorrect to say that the fire travels this way or
that way. So, too, the Buddha declares, the tathagata, when “released from conceptions
that pertain to materiality”, neither survives death nor fails to survive, is neither reborn
nor not reborn, is neither liberated from nor ensnared within samsara. Moreover, the
Buddha continues, because the tathagata is, like the great ocean, “deep, boundless,
hard to fathom”, there is no one who is named the tathagata.
Because Vacchagotta’s catuṣkoṭi is a paradigm case, the lesson also generalizes. In
the face of Reference Failure, conceptualizations fail to limn the structure of reality.
There is no one who is named the tathagata. So the tathagata is neither empty nor non-
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empty (see MMK 22.11). There is no one who is named the Buddha. So the Buddha
neither survives nor fails to survive death. There is no individual that is named the
cosmos. So the cosmos is neither finite nor infinite. There is no individual that is named
the soul. So the soul is neither the same as the body nor distinct from the body. There
is no individual that is named a dharma. So dharmas neither arise from themselves nor
arise from another. There is no individual that is named dependent upon another. So
the one who depends is neither identical to nor distinct from the one depended upon
(see MMK 18.10).
5. FURTHER CHALLENGES AND INSIGHTS
Russellian analysis of Vacchagotta’s catuṣkoṭi indicates that the alternatives therein
contain hidden quantificational structure and ideological content. The analysis readily
generalizes to other catuṣkoṭi. Yet Russellian analysis seems to fail for catuṣkoṭi about
existence and for catuṣkoṭi that merit affirmation of their alternatives. I address these
challenges sequentially. Modifying the Russellian strategy for analyzing catuṣkoṭi
about existence requires careful attention to the logical structure of singular existentials.
For purposes of motivating and explaining these modifications, I introduce an example
that has yet to receive sustained attention in recent literature on catuṣkoṭi. The example
is apt, because it appears in the context of analyzing the misunderstandings that tend to
befall those who endeavor to understand catuṣkoṭi. Attending to advice about how to
forestall these understandings motivates a strategy for extending the Russellian strategy
to affirmative catuṣkoṭi.
5.1

EXISTENTIAL CATUṢKOṬI

Catuṣkoṭi about existence are exceedingly common in the discourses of Chinese
Buddhists. Fa Zang 法藏 (643-712), the third patriarch of the Hua-Yan 華嚴 tradition,
provides a paradigmatic and instructive example. The example appears in the first
section of the final chapter of his Treatise on the Five Teachings (Hua-Yan-Wu-JiaoZhang 華 嚴 五 教 章 ). Fa Zang argues that every dharma has three distinct but
inseparable natures. He realizes that some might understand him to be claiming that his
names for these natures refer to existing individuals. But the natures are empty, and so
the names fail to refer. For the sake of guarding against attachment to the existence of
the natures, he develops a series of catuṣkoṭi (T45.1866.499c5-500a16).
Consider Fa Zang’s first catuṣkoṭi. The issue is whether the real nature (zhen ru 真
如) of the dharmas, tathata, exists (T45.1866.499c5-c11).11 Fa Zang denies that tathata
11

Whether the distinction between ultimate truth and conventional truth is relevant to understanding Fa
Zang’s catuṣkoṭi is an open and difficult question. His theory of the three natures develops a similar
theory from the Yogacara tradition (see Liu 1982). Yogacarins tend to associate real natures with
ultimate truths (D’Amato 2005, 201-202). Fa Zang also provides catuṣkoṭi for two other natures, one of
which—the discriminated nature (suo-zhi 所執)—the Yogacarins tend to associate with conventional
truth. That Fa Zang uses catuṣkoṭi to discuss both kinds of truth provides some reason to suppose that
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exists, because tathata responds to conditions (sui-yuan 隨緣) despite being constant
(bu-bian 不变). He denies that tathata does not exist, because tathata is constant despite
responding to conditions. He denies that tathata both exists and does not exist, because
tathata lacks a dual nature (er-xing 二性). He denies that tathata neither exists nor does
not exist, because tathata, like the great ocean, is endowed with profundity (ju-de 具
德).12
When names function as individual constants, the standard practice among
contemporary logicians is to translate singular existentials as existentially quantified
claims of numerical identity—for example, translating “Tathata exists” as Ǝx(x=h),
where the miniscule h is a name for tathata. This practice coheres poorly with
Reference Failure. When names function as predicates, the standard practice is to
translate singular existentials as existential quantifications over designating
predicates—for example, ƎxHx where Hx stands for “x is the one named tathata”. This
practice coheres well with Russellian analyses of catuṣkoṭi, which treat names as
predicates. Yet the practice causes trouble for Russellian analyses of catuṣkoṭi about
existence.
Consider, for example, a modified Russellian analysis for Fa Zang’s examination
of whether tathata exists, following standard conventions for translating singular
existentials. (See Table 9.)
Alternative

Russellian Analysis (Standard)

Fa Zang’s
Answer

Tathata exists.
Tathata does not exist.
Tathata both exists and
does exist.
Tathata neither exists nor
does not exist.

ƎxHx Ù NC Ù EM
¬ƎxHx Ù NC Ù EM

¬ƎxHx
¬¬ƎxHx

Ǝx(HxÙ¬Hx) Ù ¬NC Ù (EMÚ¬EM)

¬Ǝx(HxÙ¬Hx)

Ǝx¬(HxÚ¬Hx) Ù (NCÚ¬NC) Ù ¬EM

¬Ǝx¬(HxÚ¬Hx)

Table 9: Standard Russellian Analysis for an Existential Catuṣkoṭi
The problem with the analysis is that the interpretation of Fa Zang’s answer for the
second alternative is inconsistent with the presumed reason for that answer. Fa Zang
denies that tathata does not exist. But this contradicts Reference Failure, which affirms
that tathata does not exist.

the distinction among kinds of truths might be irrelevant to analyzing at least some catuṣkoṭi. I thank an
anonymous reviewer for raising this issue.
12
In declaring that tathata lacks a dual nature, Fa Zang likely means that tathata does not satisfy
contradictory predicates. In declaring that tathata is endowed with profundity, Fa Zang likely means that
tathata is simultaneously chief (zhu 主) and attendant (ban 伴), determining the characteristics of
dharmas even as those others determine its characteristics. As chief, tathata is akin to the pole star, a
constant standard by which sailors at sea orient themselves. As attendant, tathata is akin to a sailor at
sea, responsive to changing winds and tumultuous waves.
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The solution to this problem is to depart from standard practice by treating existence
as a predicate. Nakhnikian and Salmon (1982) demonstrate that such a departure is
harmless (see also Evans 1982, 345-348). Let Ex stand for “x exists”, and define this
predicate explicitly and completely as follows:
Ex =df (x=x).
Russellian analyses of singular existentials thereby yield familiar binary structures. For
example, the Russellian analysis of “Tathata exists” yields Ix[Hx; Ex]. This approach
supports a variant Russellian analysis for Fa Zang’s catuṣkoṭi about whether tathata
exists. (See Table 10.)
Alternative

Russellian Analysis
(Variant)

Tathata exists.
Tathata does not exist.
Tathata both exists and
does exist.
Tathata neither exists nor
does not exist.

Ix[Hx; Ex] Ù NC Ù EM
Ix[Hx; ¬Ex] Ù NC Ù EM
Ix[Hx; (ExÙ¬Ex)] Ù ¬NC Ù
(EMÚ¬EM)
Ix[Hx; ¬(ExÚ¬Ex)] Ù
(NCÚ¬NC) Ù ¬EM

Fa Zang’s Answer
¬Ix[Hx; Ex]
¬Ix[Hx; ¬Ex]
¬Ix[Hx; (ExÙ¬Ex)]
¬Ix[Hx; ¬(ExÚ¬Ex)]

Table 10: Variant Russellian Analysis for Existential Catuṣkoṭi
This variant analysis, unlike its standard cousin, makes Fa Zang’s denying that tathata
does not exist consistent with his affirming that no individual is designated by the name
tathata. Indeed, whereas the standard analysis presents Fa Zang’s answer to the second
alternative as inconsistent with his reason, the variant analysis presents Fa Zang’s
answer as overdetermined by available reasons. One reason for declining to affirm
Ix[Hx; ¬Ex] is reference failure. Another is descriptive failure. The second alternative,
Ix[Hx; ¬Ex], entails Ǝx¬Ex. The definition for the existence predicate yields, as a
corollary, that some existing individual is non-self-identical: Ǝx(x≠x). This is
impossible. So the second alternative is doubly incorrect, because tathata’s name fails
to refer and everything exists (¬ƎxHx and ∀xEx).
5.2

EASY TRUTHS AND SUBTLE ERRORS

The variant translation of singular existents supports a Russellian analysis of Fa Zang’s
catuṣkoṭi about whether tathata exists. The analysis supports hermeneutical insight into
some puzzling claims Fa Zang makes about his reasoning. These insights extend to an
atypical kind of catuṣkoṭi wherein the correct answers affirm all four alternatives. The
insights are important, because they justify analyzing “affirmative” catuṣkoṭi
differently than more typical “negative” catuṣkoṭi, and because they explain why the
alternatives for affirmative catuṣkoṭi should not be mutually exclusive.
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Fa Zang examines two ways of misunderstanding his catuṣkoṭi about whether
tathata exists. The first, which he labels the error of eternalism, interprets his arguments
as demonstrating that tathata exists. Fa Zang’s discussion is dense, but the error seems
to rely upon some attractive reasoning. Suppose tathata does not exist because tathata
is constant and responds to conditions. Then tathata is constant. So, it seems, there is
some existing individual that is constant, and this individual is identical to tathata. It
follows that tathata exists. Fa Zang categorizes this result as eternalist, presumably
because it entails that tathata’s name refers to an existing individual. Fa Zang
categorizes the result as an error, because he maintains that tathata’s name fails to refer.
The way to avoid the error of eternalism is to deny that tathata’s name refers to an
existing individual. But this risks a second error that Fa Zang labels annihilationism.
Suppose tathata’s name fails to refer. Then any existing individual identical to tathata
is inconstant. Because nothing is non-self-identical, it follows that tathata is inconstant.
Hence, there is some existing individual who is identical to tathata but inconstant. It
follows that tathata exists. Fa Zang categorizes this result as an error, presumably
because it serves as a reductio ad absurdum for the claim that tathata’s name fails to
refer.
Although Fa Zang is clear in declaring that eternalism and annihilationism are
errors, he is less clear when explaining why the reasoning in their support fails
(T45.1866.500b5-b6). He warns those prone to such reasoning to know that tathata
being constant does not differ from tathata being inconstant (zhen-ru-bu-yi-chang-zhiwu-chang 真如不異常之無常). Russellian analysis vindicates Fa Zang’s advice. If there
is no existing individual named tathata, predicating constancy of tathata does not differ
from predicating inconstancy of tathata, because both predications yield falsehoods.
Fa Zang’s advice, unfortunately, does not explain how the reasoning for eternalism and
annihilationism goes awry. Here, again, formal analysis is helpful.
The argument for eternalism begins from Fa Zang’s declaration that tathata is
constant and responds to conditions. Let Cx stand for “x is constant” and Rx stand for
“x is responsive to conditions”. Let the miniscule t be an individual constant that names
tathata. Then the supporting inferences seem to proceed as follows: from Fa Zang’s
declaration, infer Ǝx((CxÙRx)Ùx=t); after simplifying to Ǝx(x=t), conclude that tathata
exists. The argument for annihilationism begins from Fa Zang’s presumption that
tathata’s name fails to refer. The supporting inferences seem to proceed as follows:
from Fa Zang’s presumption, infer ¬Ǝx(x=t); by addition, infer ¬Ǝx(x=tÙCx); because
¬t≠t, simplify to ¬ƎxCx; then instantiate to ¬Ct and generalize to Ǝx(¬CxÙx=t); after
simplifying to Ǝx(x=t), conclude that tathata exists.
The arguments for eternalism and annihilationism seem to be valid. The errors are
difficult to discern. But the argument for annihilationism errs almost immediately by
positing that some individual, witnessed by the miniscule t, is the referent of tathata’s
name. This posit vindicates the reasoning from Fa Zang’s presumption (that tathata’s
name fails to refer) to ¬Ǝx(x=t). If, however, tathata’s name functions as a predicate
(as Russellian analysis advises), the proper formalization of Fa Zang’s presumption is
¬ƎxHx. So formalized, Fa Zang’s presumption does not support the subsequent
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reasoning for annihilationism: if no individual is the one named tathata, tathata is not
a self-identical individual. (Nor, for that matter, is tathata a non-self-identical
individual.) Unfortunately, treating tathata’s name as a predicate seems to vindicate
the argument for eternalism. From Fa Zang’s declaration (that tathata is constant and
responsive to conditions), infer Ǝx(HxÙ(CxÙRx)); simplify to ƎxHx; then conclude
that tathata exists.
The error in the reasoning for eternalism is extremely subtle. The error in the
argument for annihilationism provides a clue. Properly formalized, Fa Zang’s
presumption is ¬ƎxHx. This entails both ∀x(Hx®Cx) and ∀x(Hx®¬Cx): whatever is
tathata is constant, and whatever is tathata is inconstant. These are the truths embedded
in Fa Zang advice that tathata being constant does not differ from tathata being
inconstant. More significantly, however, ∀x(Hx®Cx) is a plausible candidate for what
Fa Zang means in declaring that tathata is constant. The argument for eternalism
thereby fails, because ∀x(Hx®Cx) does not entail ƎxHx.
5.3

AFFIRMATIVE CATUṢKOṬI

Many catuṣkoṭi in the Buddhist tradition aim to diminish attachment by fostering
insight into the ontological innocence of conceptual designation (Skt. prajnapti). The
correct answer to each alternative in these catuṣkoṭi is denial, because each alternative
suffers from referential failure. There are, however, some catuṣkoṭi for which the
correct answer to each alternative is affirmation. In his Great Cessation and
Contemplation, Zhi Yi offers a sophisticated example, affirming that everything arises
and perishes, neither arises nor perishes, both arises and perishes and neither arises nor
perishes, and neither both arises and perishes nor neither arises not perishes (see
Swanson 2018, 178-180). But Nagarjuna provides the paradigm case:
All is real, or all is unreal, all is both real and unreal, all is neither unreal nor real; this is
the graded teaching of the Buddha (MMK 18.8; trans. Katsura and Siderits 2013, 200).

The scope of this catuṣkoṭi is everything (Skt. sarva), and by this Nagarjuna seems to
mean whatever his Buddhist peers and predecessors are inclined to affirm as existing:
ayatanas, skandhas, dhatus, dharmas, and so on. In categorizing the catuṣkoṭi as
“graded teaching” (Skt. anusasana), Nagarjuna signals that each alternative is more
sophisticated than its predecessor and, therefore, that more sophisticated teachings are
appropriate for more sophisticated audiences. In categorizing the catuṣkoṭi as the
Buddha’s teaching, Nagarjuna signals that all four alternatives merit affirmation—and
so all Buddhist traditions, including those he criticizes as incorrect, convey some truth.
Consider, then, a specific skandha. Let it be materiality (rupa). Nagarjuna’s
contention is that materiality is real, unreal, both real and unreal, and neither real nor
unreal. Let Mx stand for “x is the one named materiality”, and let Rx stand for “x is
real”. Then, disregarding the status of Non-Contradiction and Bivalence, the Russellian
analysis for the materiality-instance of Nagarjuna’s affirmative catuṣkoṭi seems to be
mimic the Russellian analysis for Vacchagotta’s negative catuṣkoṭi. (See Table 11.)
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Materiality is real.
Materiality is unreal.
Materiality is both real and unreal.
Materiality is neither real nor unreal.

Ix[Mx; Rx]
Ix[Mx; ¬Rx]
Ix[Mx; (RxÙ¬Rx)]
Ix[Mx; ¬(RxÚ¬Rx)]

Table 11: Naive Analysis of an Affirmative Catuṣkoṭi
The affirmative catuṣkoṭi, so interpreted, is disastrous. The analysis presents Nagarjuna
as affirming a contradiction by virtue of affirming the first two alternatives. It presents
him as affirming two further contradictions, as well, by virtue of affirming the third
and fourth alternatives. Fortunately, the problem here is not the catuṣkoṭi or
Nagarjuna’s affirmations therein. The problem is the naive analysis of the alternatives.
Nagarjuna’s central teaching is Universal Reference Failure. According to his
predecessors in the Abhidharma tradition, only names for composites fail to refer. But
for Nagarjuna, all names fail to refer, because names always only designate empty
individuals and empty individuals do not exist. The naive analysis of the materiality
catuṣkoṭi thereby yields four false alternatives. Each is false, because the analysis
incorrectly presumes that materiality’s name designates something that exists.
There is a more sophisticated Russellian analysis for the materiality-instance of
Nagarjuna’s affirmative catuṣkoṭi. This alternative analysis begins from the assumption
that materiality fails to refer: ¬ƎxMx. Nagarjuna affirms this assumption at MMK 18.9.
The assumption entails both ∀x(Mx®Rx) and ∀x(Mx®¬Rx): whatever is materiality
is real, and whatever is materiality is unreal. These are, respectively, the first two
alternatives for Nagarjuna’s catuṣkoṭi. Whoever affirms Reference Failure for
materiality should affirm both alternatives. Nagarjuna’s assumption (¬ƎxMx) also
entails ∀x(Mx®(RxÙ¬Rx)), which in turn entails ∀x(Mx®¬(RxÚ¬Rx): whatever is
materiality is both real and unreal, and whatever is materiality is neither real nor unreal.
These are, respectively, the final two alternatives for Nagarjuna’s catuṣkoṭi. Whoever
affirms Reference Failure for materiality should affirm them both. (See Table 12.)
Materiality is real.
Materiality is unreal.
Materiality is both real and unreal.
Materiality is neither real nor unreal.

∀x(Mx®Rx)
∀x(Mx®¬Rx)
∀x(Mx®(RxÙ¬Rx))
∀x(Mx®¬(RxÚ¬Rx)

Table 12: Sophisticated Analysis of an Affirmative Catuṣkoṭi
The sophisticated analysis ascribes to each alternative hidden logical structure.
These ascriptions, quantificational and otherwise, are well-motivated. They follow
naturally from the assumption that the name for materiality fails to refer, and they honor
Fa Zang’s advice for avoiding misunderstandings. The analysis does not, however,
present the alternatives as mutually exclusive. If the analysis is correct, affirming the
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third requires affirming each of the first two; and affirming the third is tantamount to
affirming the fourth. The analysis fails, therefore, to satisfy the aforementioned three
adequacy conditions for successful analyses. I maintain, however, that this does not
count against the aptness of the analysis. The requirement of mutual exclusivity among
the alternatives, while appropriate for negative catuṣkoṭi, is inappropriate for
affirmative ones.
That a successful analysis of Buddhist catuṣkoṭi ought to present the four
alternatives as mutually exclusive is a requirement more often asserted than justified.
Kreutz offers a concise argument in its favor.
A model for the catuṣkoṭi has to maintain the mutual exclusivity and exhaustive nature of
the kotis – call this the exclusivity/exhaustivity constraint. The reason is twofold: (1) we
want to be charitable to the logical abilities to the authors who were using the catuṣkoṭi,
and (2) is the way the (negative) catuṣkoṭi is commonly employed as an argument,
supposed to undermine all possible ways a predicate can be attributed to something needs
the four kotis to exhaust the logical space, which they can only do if they are mutually
exclusive. This argument, which is a kind of reductio argument to reveal the deficiency of
the concept in question is called a prasanga argument (Kreutz 2019, 68).

The reasons Kreutz adduces for mutual exclusivity are fair and plausible for negative
catuṣkoṭi. Negative catuṣkoṭi typically appear in rhetorical contexts directed toward
disabusing an interlocutor of the presumption that certain names designate existing
individuals, and the dialectical structure implicit in these contexts seems to structure
the sequential presentation of alternatives in a way that presumes their mutual
exclusivity. But Kreutz’s reasons are less fair and plausible for affirmative catuṣkoṭi.
Affirmative catuṣkoṭi appear in rhetorical contexts directed toward instructing those
who realize that names fail to refer, and the dialectical structure implicit in these
contexts seems to structure the sequential presentation of alternatives as aiming to
emphasize their mutual inclusivity. That is, whereas the goal of negative catuṣkoṭi is to
guide the interlocutor toward realizing that many distinct alternatives are false because
of referential failure, the goal of positive catuṣkoṭi is to guide the interlocutor toward
realizing that, because of referential failure, distinctions among alternatives are merely
apparent. So it is a virtue, rather than a vice, of the sophisticated analysis that it presents
the four alternatives as mutually inclusive.
A further virtue of the sophisticated analysis is the insight it reveals regarding the
soteriological significance of the four alternatives in affirmative catuṣkoṭi. The
sophisticated analysis for the materiality-instance of Nagarjuna’s affirmative catuṣkoṭi
is applicable to anything within the scope of the Buddha’s graded teaching. Everything
named is real, unreal, both, and neither, because all names fail to refer. Affirmative
catuṣkoṭi qualify as the Buddha’s teaching, because the Buddha teaches that names fail
to refer. The teaching qualifies as graded, with different alternatives appropriate for
different audiences, not because some audiences lack the logical facility to derive the
truth of some alternatives, and not because some alternatives are more correct than
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others, but because each alternative presents different risks for error. 13 The third
alternative risks the confusion of supposing that Non-Contradiction fails; the fourth, of
supposing that Bivalence fails. Ruegg notes the soteriological danger of each:
if there really existed such a dialectical synthesis [failure of Non-Contradiction] or third
value [failure of Bivalence], there would be something on which conceptual thinking could
base itself and cling, and the entire purpose of the Madhyamaka method could then no
longer be achieved (Ruegg 1997, 47).

The second alternative risks the confusion of supposing that reference fails because
nothing exists, which in turn risks attachment to non-existence. The first, finally, risks
the confusion of supposing that names designate existing individuals, and this risks
attachment to existence.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Russellian analyses of Buddhist catuṣkoṭi yield several insights. The analyses clarify
the role and meaning of Reference Failure in securing uniform truth valuations for all
four alternatives. They highlight dialectical connections among adjacent alternatives.
They motivate different interpretations for affirmative and negative catuṣkoṭi, and they
justify differences in the conditions for evaluating analyses of each kind of catuṣkoṭi.
They reveal, as well, some unexpected risks associated with deciding whether to treat
names as predicates or individual constants, and with deciding how to interpret singular
existentials. Russellian analyses achieve these insights, moreover, with minimal
ideology. They are well-motivated in their ascriptions of logical structure to all four
alternatives, and they do not rely upon non-standard devices such as paraconsistent
logic or illocutionary denial.14
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Here I develop Katsura and Siderits’ suggestion that “perhaps the hierarchy [among the alternatives
of the catuṣkoṭi at MMK 18.8] is not based on increasing accuracy but on increasing usefulness for
achieving our goal (in this case, the cessation of suffering)” (Katsura and Siderits 2013, 202). For more
on the significance of language for Madhyamakan soteriology, see Tsai 2014.
14
I do not claim to have resolved all exegetical issues concerning Buddhist catuṣkoṭi. For example, I
discuss neither the extent to which Russellian analyses facilitate insight into the distinction between
ultimate truth and conventional truth, nor the ways in which Universal Reference Failure might relate
to the practice of skillful means (upaya). These substantial topics remain for future work. For some
indication of the issues at stake, see Garfield 2010 as well as Matsunaga and Matsunaga 1974,
respectively.
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